# UN COUNTERPLAN

# NEG

## 1NC’s

### 1NC – General

#### The United Nations should [insert plan]

#### UN solves best

Garcia 2/24/2022 (Denise Garcia, Ph.D., Associate Professor of the College of Social Sciences and Humanities at Northeastern University, member of the International Panel for the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, serves on the research board of the Toda Peace Institute (Tokyo), the Institute for Economics and Peace (Sydney), member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, Nobel Peace Institute fellow, 2-24-2022, "The United Nations’ Focal Diplomatic Role on Emerging Technologies," Science & Diplomacy, <https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2022/united-nations-focal-diplomatic-role-emerging-technologies>, LASA-CSK)

The focus on emerging technologies and cyberspace as a novel domain of international relations marks a noteworthy evolution of the role of the United Nations (UN) in promoting much-needed norms for common behavior in diplomacy, not anticipated by the drafters of the original Charter. I argue that the United Nations is the premier, inclusive, and ideal forum where universally agreed-upon norms in the areas of emerging technologies can be created, and that UN Secretary-General António Guterres is already leading a concerted effort towards this goal. In May 2021, the United Nations Security Council met for the first time to discuss the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) in peace and security. The following month, the Security Council met to discuss how to keep peace in cyberspace, also for the first time, ushering emerging technologies into the highest level of diplomatic efforts at the UN.1 According to the United Nations Charter, the Council has custodianship of decisions on peace, security, the protection of civilians, and the use of force in international relations. Member states spent US 1 trillion in 2020 to restore networks that had been breached or to combat malicious uses of technology.2 The need to create a global cooperative framework on cyberspace where states can increase their capacities and assist those who lack them is critical. The UN Secretary-General’s role is critical. He created a High-Level Panel for Digital Cooperation that met in 2018–2019. In March 2019, he called for a prohibition of autonomous weapons: “machines with the power and discretion to take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant, and should be prohibited by international law.”3 The UN Secretary-General has called on states to set limits on autonomous weapons, motivated by the belief that the use of these systems will profoundly transform war and drive humanity into a morally indefensible realm.4 Based upon the High-Level Panel’s recommendations, and after consultations with academics, the private sector, governments, and civil society, Guterres recommended a Road Map for Digital Cooperation in time for the UN’s 75th anniversary.5 The Road Map aims to bridge the digital divide between developing and developed countries, create transparency by curbing the spread of misinformation, protect critical digital infrastructure, and protect people’s dignity. The Road Map also seeks to restrain the weaponization of emerging technologies in general and instead require that such technologies be used solely for the common good of humanity.6 There is admittedly much work ahead to carry out the Road Map for Digital Cooperation, especially in the areas of misinformation, the spread of hate speech, and the digital divide between developed and developing countries. However, there is one area within emerging technologies that has gained sustained attention in the last five years: the first formal meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems was held in Geneva from November 13 to 17, 2017.7 The proactive and preventive action-oriented role that the UN Secretary-General assumed has firmly placed the United Nations as the cornerstone for global action in emerging technologies. For Guterres, there are four significant threats to global security today: mounting geopolitical tensions, the climate crisis, global mistrust, and the dark side of technology to commit abuses and crimes, spread hate and misinformation, and oppress people in an increasing number of countries. Technological advancements are quickly outpacing diplomatic efforts to regulate their use, and the world is not prepared for the impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

#### The counterplan bolsters UN influence, which solves global peace. Only letting NATO die allows UN resurgence.

Verma 22, convener of the Media Relations Department of BJP in India, author of “Narendra Modi: the GameChanger” (Sudesh, “NATO has failed: UN must be strengthened,” The Daily Guardian, <https://thedailyguardian.com/nato-has-failed-un-must-be-strengthened/)//BB>

NATO creates an unequal world and undermines the credibility of the UN. If other countries start emulating the example of NATO and create their own separate military alliances, this would be an end to the existence of the UN. This would also create a fertile ground for tension all across the globe. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine has exposed the world’s inability to control the situation if a powerful State decides to use its military power to set things right with its immediate neighbouring countries. The prime reason for this massive failure is the absence of a moral and righteous world body that has the mechanism to implement dharma-based order. NATO clearly does not fit the bill. The only organisation that could do this is the United Nations but it has got weakened due to shadow boxing by major world powers—the Big Five that includes the US, the UK, France, China and Russia. They trust their own military strength and have no reason to strengthen the UN. The veto enjoyed by them ensures that this body remains defunct to prevent any major crisis involving any of these players. All these five have developed sophisticated weaponry and are major suppliers of arms across the world. NATO cannot replace the UN since it is a group of countries having a vested interest to empower itself and maintain superiority vis-a-vis other countries. The world does not matter to NATO countries if they are not involved in acts of war with non-NATO countries. And if push comes to shove NATO can fight any country or grouping in the world based on its combined military strength and economic might. At least NATO would like to believe this. The fact that three permanent members of the UN Security with veto are members of the NATO—France, the UK and the US—makes it evident that the organisation seeks to be happy with its own enclave where they would enjoy liberty, freedom and democracy and will also have the wherewithal to fight others if these are hurt. Even in the vastly interdependent and integrated world, NATO believes that it can live peacefully even if other countries suffer. The UN has 193 members which means that 163 countries are outside the NATO framework. Becoming a member of NATO brings in security plus economic empowerment. Actually, the strategy of the British Empire where the military back-up by the Crown was used to further business interests has been emulated by NATO. NATO would intervene if its economic interest is hurt or if it concludes that certain actions of any country are hurting its core held principles. The massive airpower would ensure that NATO troops would not even need to be on the ground if it desires to punish a country. The control over English media by NATO countries both in terms of finance, governmental control and ideology would ensure that a larger legitimacy is provided to its actions. The US intervention in Afghanistan was justified as much as its withdrawal that happened after two decades. The US intervened in Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction but when it did not find any, it blamed intelligence failure. The UN has been relegated to providing legitimacy to the course of action decided by NATO. These NATO countries have enough clout because of their influence and are able to lobby successfully at the UN and get the support of smaller countries to add to their legitimacy. One wonders why was NATO not disbanded with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact—a military alliance of former communist countries with the erstwhile USSR as the fulcrum. Both the Warsaw Pact and the NATO were offshoots of the Cold war and hence when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991, NATO should have followed the same course. On the contrary, NATO expanded by inducting former Soviets into it. NATO creates an unequal world and undermines the credibility of the UN. If other countries start emulating the example of NATO and create their own separate military alliances, this would be an end to the existence of the UN. This would also create fertile ground for tension all across the globe. The world would be divided into exclusive economic and military blocs. Ukraine should serve as a lesson to NATO that it cannot do anything in a war-like situation with a powerful country. Some members of NATO are now realising that economic sanctions are going to hurt their own interests more than the interest of Russia. Had NATO not given false confidence to Ukraine and provoked it to seek NATO membership, the present crisis could have been avoided. You can appreciate the security concerns of other countries only when you understand the vulnerabilities. If you are strongly protected by the umbrella of a powerful security alliance you would not feel the pinch. Ukraine was the best as a buffer country between Russia and Western Europe. When Ukraine was forced to abandon its nuclear arsenals all the powers had ensured that it would stay safe and secure and the world would stand guarantee to its neutrality. Sending arms to that country and trying to influence it to become a member of the European Union and then NATO was a violation of that charter. Russian intervention in Ukraine cannot be justified in today’s world and any issue of provocation must be resolved through dialogues. But when unbiased history would be written about this crisis, one would not be able to ignore the fact that Russian overtures to talks were spurned by an overconfident NATO led by the US. Was it not provoked to use its military might to set things right from Russia’s perspective? NATO must ponder over this. The high-sounding words trying to bulldoze Russian President Vladimir Putin have proved to be hollow. NATO cannot get into direct war with Russia since the threat of nuclear weapons poses threat to the entire humanity. The need for a stronger UN was never felt more acutely than it is today. Panic gripped the world when on 4 March, the Russian military fired at the power units of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—the largest nuclear facility in Europe. Energoatom which operates nuclear plants in Ukraine appealed to the world community saying that heavy shelling at the nuclear plants was “a severe violation of nuclear and radiation safety which can lead to hard and tragic consequences for the whole world!” The world had woken up to the warning that it could witness a tragedy worst than that of Chernobyl. Those who may have forgotten must know what Chernobyl disaster a nuclear accident that happened on 26 April 1984 during a routine checking at one of the nuclear plants at Chernobyl. This generated more radioactive radiation than the two bombs that were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Chernobyl and areas around it were evacuated and largescale relocation of the population took place in affected areas. The radiation led to people getting various diseases, particularly thyroid cancer. An area of 30 sq km around the plant is now made an exclusion zone where people cannot visit. Close to 150,000 Sq Kms of land area in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine were supposed to have been contaminated. Has the world evolved any mechanism to take care of such eventualities? You can blame one country or the other for the tragedy but who will be responsible for the largescale death and devastation resulting from this no gain blame game. Who is responsible for the death and destruction in Ukraine? The US, NATO or Russia? Or is it the entire world that failed to take corrective action in time? Whether a war or economic sanctions, the result is the same. The common people who have no role suffer the most. If we call ourselves civilised why can’t we evolve a strong mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes? There are few hotspots of the world and immediate attention must be given to them so that rival territorial claims do not become a reason for military conquest. The UN is the only institution that promises hope. A larger role to the UN means that all military alliances or such pacts between countries must be dismantled. The UN must be strengthened to use force too if and when needed—not only for peacekeeping but also for bringing an errant country to sense. One factor that has made the UN almost non-functional in matters of such conflict is the power of the veto. Why should any country have a veto?

### 1NC – Cyber

#### [Insert text]

#### UN solves cybersecurity norms best

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## Solvency

### 2NC – Solvency – General

#### UNSC’s unique normative authority keeps countries in line

Sonnback, 20 (Anette Sonnback, Co-founder and director of A Path for Europe, 11-8-2020, "How Successful Has the UN Been in Maintaining International Peace and Security?," E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/11/08/how-successful-has-the-un-been-in-maintaining-international-peace-and-security/>, LASA-CSK)

The active presence of the UN in the world through its different missions has resolved disputes, inhibited escalation of conflict and spurred peace in some situations, but the inherent problems that were highlighted continue to attract criticism. The failure of the UN to foster long-term peace in settings with complex conflict-dynamics shows an important limitation to the claim to success (Sambanis 2008: 29). An alternative area in which its role as a peace and security defender has been more successful, and in my view most successful, is through the spread important norms that have ranged from expanding the security agenda to upholding a nuclear taboo. A telling example is the role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As authors such as Scott Sagan argue, norms embedded in the NPT shape “states’ identities and expectations and even powerful actors [become] constrained by the norms they [have] created” (Sagan 1997: 76). The NPT regime helped establish shared understandings of what was considered prestigious, legitimate or delegitimate and states thereby chose to disarm rather than be classified as rogue nations by the international community (Sagan 1997: 80). It has also constrained both Russia and the US in their attempts to modernize their arsenals. Even in cases where the norm has been contested, such as when US recognized India as a nuclear weapons state, it never seriously challenged the core assumptions of the nuclear non-proliferation norm (Carranza 2019: 14). Critics would disagree and argue that the accomplishments in the area of nuclear disarmament has been weak, as with collective security (MacKenzie 2015: 489), but the UN’s efforts have evidently hindered armament and possible escalation, pointing to a major success for maintaining peace and security in the world. Beyond nuclear disarmament, there is also the shared understanding of illegitimate and legitimate uses of force. The UNSC holds strong authority in this realm, which again points to the normative power of the UN in its role for maintaining international peace and security (Mingst and Karns 2011: 100). Even though tensions can run high between states in the Security Council, this shared understanding has enhanced the risks that an aggressor might face when “breaking” these norms, as the response from the international community can take the form of international condemnation, coordinated sanctions or even humanitarian intervention. This last point particularly derives from the enhanced focus on human rights and human security within the UN, as well as the shifting nature of war after the Cold War (Bellamy 2013: 488). The principles of sovereignty and non-interference came into question with the atrocities committed during intrastate conflicts such as in Rwanda and Bosnia. The “responsibility to protect” principle (R2P) was thereby born during the 2005 World Summit, which came to mean that all states have a responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity (UN 2020b). In cases where a state couldn’t or wouldn’t fulfil this function, humanitarian intervention by the international community would be legitimate. This is in line with the human security agenda that was promoted by the UN in the 1990s, as the security of individuals was to be prioritized over the protection of the state (Hampson 2013: 279). While it contradicts the thesis of realism with its focus on self-interested states, there have been debates on this new role for the UN and how successful it has actually been to use force to support human security objectives (Hampson 2013: 286). One main criticism is about the questions of interpretation. Who dictates when this responsibility is to be invoked? There have also been instances where unlawful intervention has been done in the name of R2P, such as in the case of Russia’s intervention in Georgia where they claimed to protect Russian citizens (Allison 2009: 178). However, the jointly accepted humanitarian intervention in Libya 2011 based on the R2P norm is an important example that illustrates how normative shifts driven by the UN can bring nations together to protect peace and security in the world. Both China and Russia agreed to humanitarian intervention, despite their traditional opposition to it, which stopped Qaddafi from proceeding with possible crimes against humanity (Bellamy 2013: 500). Beyond operational successes, the fact that the international community has agreed to legitimize action to protect human beings as such rather than states, and that there is a general understanding that states should not stand idly by while atrocities are committed, remain two key achievement for the UN in the realm of peace and security. The naiveté that liberal institutionalism has been charged with is confirmed by the difficulty to cooperate in areas that are so clearly still part of the realm of national interests (Weiss 2018: 178). Despite this, history has shown that UN nations, and the P5, are agreeing on important resolutions and overcoming their differences. States have also acted in line with the normative frameworks that the UN has promoted. The UN can be and should be criticized for its inability to act where needed or for its inability to stop action deemed damaging to peace and security, but it has an ability to adapt and reinvent itself in line with emerging global challenges that shouldn’t be undermined (MacKenzie 2015: 490). Such adaptability gives constructivism right in its understanding that process affects interests, which thereby transforms structure (Wendt 1992: 393). This understanding explains how the UNCS has been able to legitimize certain norms and practices, even when they intrude into the realm of national sovereignty (Williams & Bellamy 2013: 416). The UN is indeed the sum of its parts, composed of member states with their individual interests, but state interaction in this institutional context continue to shape states’ evolving interest, enabling policy change that corresponds with its task of maintaining peace and security.

#### The counterplan effectively imposes international constraints on the whole community. Ukraine proves.

AS 6/28 (AS, 6-28-2022, "What are the differences between NATO, the UN and the EU?," <https://en.as.com/latest_news/what-are-the-differences-between-nato-the-un-and-the-eu-n/>, LASA-CSK)

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not only played out in Ukrainian territory, but also at an institutional level, with important international organisations taking on a major role. This is the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). There are multiple differences between NATO, the UN and the EU - from their origin, to their method of solving problems, to their influence over international conflicts. In the case of the UN, founded in 1945, with headquarters in New York and 193 member states, it has a deep-rooted social character. One of the main objectives of the UN is to enforce human rights, guarantee international peace and security, defend international law and distribute humanitarian aid wherever it is needed. The UN, unlike NATO and the EU, plays a mediating role in international conflicts. With regard to sanctions, unlike the EU, it is more influential, as it has the necessary legal instruments to impose restrictions on those countries it considers a danger to global peace and security.

#### That’s specifically true in emerging tech

Juma, 2000 (Calestous Juma, Fall 2000, "The UN's Role in the New Diplomacy," Issues in Science and Technology, <https://issues.org/stalk-4/>, LASA-CSK)

In effect, national bodies that provide scientific advice do not have a clear focal point in the UN system. But as scientific and technological issues start to dominate global affairs, ways will need to be found to provide a forum for global consensus building on scientific issues, and the UN’s ability to convene states and other actors makes it a good candidate for the task. Such a forum will not be a substitute for the activities carried out under the various specialized agencies of the UN, but it will support the work of national academies as well as other science advisory bodies.

### 2NC – Solvency – AI

#### UN has opened a path for ethical AI standards – the plan infringes on UN authority

Garcia, 20 (Eugenio V. Garcia, PhD in international relations, senior adviser on peace and security, humanitarian and legal affairs of the UN, 12-12-2020, " Multilateralism and Artificial Intelligence: What Role for the United Nations?," SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3779866, LASA-CSK)

The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) has been promoting a humanistic approach on ethics, policy, and capacity-building in response to emerging challenges related to AI, including philosophical reflections on what it means to be human in the face of disruptive technologies. Playing a key role in this regard, the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), an advisory body created in 1998 to give policy advice for decision-makers, pioneered workshops and roundtables leading up to the publication of a report on robotics ethics, with a view to positioning UNESCO as a valuable instrument for intellectual exchanges on this matter. 44 Furthermore, the first International Research Centre of Artificial Intelligence (IRCAI), under the auspices of UNESCO, shall have its seat in Slovenia, aiming to provide a coordination point, funding route, and exploitation accelerator for approaches to the SDGs that make use of AI.45 More recently, an Ad Hoc Expert Group of 24 members was tasked by UNESCO to produce, in a two-year process, the first draft of a global standard-setting instrument on ethics of AI. In a preliminary study released in July 2019, it was stressed that AI is not confined to a tangible location, which makes regulation of AI technology more challenging nationally and internationally. Due to their transnational character, durable solutions need to be found at the global level. A normative instrument on the ethics of AI should serve as a means of mainstreaming universal values into AI systems, which must be compatible with internationally agreed human rights and standards, and be aligned to a human-centred vision.46 Some experts believe that UNESCO’s contribution, within its mandate, could be complementary to other initiatives under way, such as by the OECD, but with a focus upon aspects that are generally neglected: culture, education, science, and communication. The definitive format of this normative document (either a declaration, recommendation, or a convention to be approved by Member States) will be decided by UNESCO’s General Conference by the end of 2021. However, a non-binding recommendation on basic principles has been considered so far more flexible and better suited to the complexity of the ethical questions raised by AI. Following internal consultations and virtual meetings, the Ad Hoc Expert Group made available online, in May 2020, a “zero draft” of its outcome document to invite commentaries by the public. In addition to values and principles drawn from or inspired by the consensus achieved in the 80+ published frameworks related to AI ethics, areas of policy action were given special attention: promoting diversity and inclusiveness; addressing labour market changes and the social, economic, cultural, and environmental impact of AI; fostering education, awareness, international cooperation, governance mechanisms, and AI ethics research and development; and ensuring trustworthiness of AI systems, responsibility, accountability, and privacy.47 The experts of the Group are especially worried about the need for a multidisciplinary, holistic approach, with due regard to human rights. They mostly agree that the UN has a significant role to play, akin to a “beacon,” empowering people and increasing participation by all sectors of society. 48 Also important, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) established in 2017 a Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in The Hague, with the aim of disseminating information, undertaking training activities, and promoting public awareness. Directed by Irakli Beridze, the Centre has been active in cybercrime, law enforcement (in partnership with Interpol), criminal justice, counterterrorism, and malicious use of AI from the perspective of its mandate. In 2018, the website “AI & Global Governance” of the Centre for Policy Research of the United Nations University (UNU) began to publish online crossdisciplinary insights and “inform existing debates from the lens of multilateralism,” as a tool for Member States, multilateral agencies, funds, programs, and other partners.49 Other noteworthy activities include the following: research on AI-related technologies conducted by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR); the UN Innovation Network, connecting a collaborative community within the UN system; the Innovation Cell of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), aimed at incubating and leveraging use cases in peace and security; as well as a myriad of projects developed by UN agencies to apply AI in their daily practice in the field.5

#### UN regulation of AI solves or lack thereof is an alt cause

Fournier-Tombs, 21 (Eleonore Fournier-Tombs, 5-31-2021, "The United Nations needs to start regulating the 'Wild West' of artificial intelligence," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/the-united-nations-needs-to-start-regulating-the-wild-west-of-artificial-intelligence-161257>, LASA-CSK)

Naturally, the European Union does not have jurisdiction over the United Nations, which is governed by international law. The exclusion therefore does not come as a surprise, but does point to a gap in AI regulation. The United Nations therefore needs its own regulation for artificial intelligence, and urgently so. Artificial intelligence technologies have been used increasingly by the United Nations. Several research and development labs, including the Global Pulse Lab, the Jetson initiative by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees , UNICEF’s Innovation Labs and the Centre for Humanitarian Data have focused their work on developing artificial intelligence solutions that would support the UN’s mission, notably in terms of anticipating and responding to humanitarian crises. United Nations agencies have also used biometric identification to manage humanitarian logistics and refugee claims. The UNHCR developed a biometrics database which contained the information of 7.1 million refugees. The World Food Program has also used biometric identification in aid distribution to refugees, coming under some criticism in 2019 for its use of this technology in Yemen. In parallel, the United Nations has partnered with private companies that provide analytical services. A notable example is the World Food Programme, which in 2019 signed a contract worth US$45 million with Palantir, an American firm specializing in data collection and artificial intelligence modelling. In 2014, the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) awarded a US$20 billion-dollar contract to Palantir to track undocumented immigrants in the U.S., especially family members of children who had crossed the border alone. Several human rights watchdogs, including Amnesty International, have raised concerns about Palantir for human rights violations. Like most AI initiatives developed in recent years, this work has happened largely without regulatory oversight. There have been many attempts to set up ethical modes of operation, such as the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ Peer Review Framework, which sets out a method for overseeing the technical development and implementation of AI models. In the absence of regulation, however, tools such as these, without legal backing, are merely best practices with no means of enforcement. In the European Commission’s AI regulation proposal, developers of high-risk systems must go through an authorization process before going to market, just like a new drug or car. They are required to put together a detailed package before the AI is available for use, involving a description of the models and data used, along with an explanation of how accuracy, privacy and discriminatory impacts will be addressed. The AI applications in question include biometric identification, categorization and evaluation of the eligibility of people for public assistance benefits and services. They may also be used to dispatch of emergency first response services — all of these are current uses of AI by the United Nations. Yemeni men carrying sacks of food for distribution. The UN World Food Program distributed food in Yemen, as shown in this photo from Sept. 2018. The United Nations later faced criticism for its use of biometrics in aid distribution. (AP Photo/Hammadi Issa) Building trust Conversely, the lack of regulation at the United Nations can be considered a challenge for agencies seeking to adopt more effective and novel technologies. As such, many systems seem to have been developed and later abandoned without being integrated into actual decision-making systems. An example of this is the Jetson tool, which was developed by UNHCR to predict the arrival of internally displaced persons to refugee camps in Somalia. The tool does not appear to have been updated since 2019, and seems unlikely to transition into the humanitarian organization’s operations. Unless, that is, it can be properly certified by a new regulatory system. Trust in AI is difficult to obtain, particularly in United Nations work, which is highly political and affects very vulnerable populations. The onus has largely been on data scientists to develop the credibility of their tools. A regulatory framework like the one proposed by the European Commission would take the pressure off data scientists in the humanitarian sector to individually justify their activities. Instead, agencies or research labs who wanted to develop an AI solution would work within a regulated system with built-in accountability. This would produce more effective, safer and more just applications and uses of AI technology.

#### AI tech standardization alone fails – UN is key

Kong, 19 (Jolene Yiqiao Kong, 09-04-2019, "AI & Global Governance Platform: How Should UN Agencies Respond to AI and Big Data?," No Publication, <https://cpr.unu.edu/publications/articles/ai-global-governance-platform-how-should-un-agencies-respond-to-ai-and-big-data.html>/ LASA-CSK)

Analysis of how the three forces combine around specific missions, technologies, and political narratives is vital for any UN agency. In this context, we offer three additional recommendations: The UN commitment to a human-centered and rights-based approach should guide UN policy into the 21st To do so, UN agencies must be aware of how AI and big data can undermine privacy and informed consent as well as cause unfair, biased and discriminative outcomes through opaque processes of AI-driven identification, profiling and automated decision-making. All UN agencies should debate and discuss these issues, both internally and externally, to push for new policies and regulatory measures that are guided by the overall UN mission and by the agency’s specific mission. UN agencies need to establish their own policies which ensure that all decision-making within their agency remains centred on human rights and civil liberties in this new era. In a UN context of hope that often emphasizes the benefits of “AI for Good” to achieve SDGs, UN agencies should acknowledge and address the risks of AI and big data for their missions that follow from often-overlooked or de-emphasized fear and freedom narratives, which may endanger the human rights and civil liberties of the key populations each UN agency serves. That can’t be solved by technological standardization alone.

### 2NC – Solvency – Biotech

#### The UN is key to including Russia on biotech discussions

Pilkington and Oladipo, 3/22 (Ed Pilkington and Gloria Oladipo, 3-22-2022, "What are Russia’s biological weapons claims and what’s actually happening?," <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/11/russia-biological-weapon-claim-us-un-ukraine-bio-labs-explainer>, LASA-CSK)

The United Nations security council met earlier this month at Russia’s request, to discuss Moscow’s claims that the US is funding “military biological activities” in Ukraine – in other words, secretly developing biological weapons in Ukrainian laboratories. The event incited heated discussion. The Russian ambassador to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, evoked the specter of an “uncontrolled spread of bio agents from Ukraine”. His American counterpart, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, warned that Russia’s claim could be a pretext for launching its own biological weapons attack on Ukraine.

#### The UN is the only way Russia and China will cooperate

Sheng, 3/12 (Yang Sheng, 3-12-2022, "China urges hard evidence from US to clarify bio weapons suspicion in Ukraine," Global Times, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1254661.shtml>, LASA-CSK)

As the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to unfold, the Russian government claimed that its forces found the US is using laboratories in Ukraine to develop biological weapons, but the US denied such claims and accused Russia of spreading "disinformation." During a UN Security Council meeting on this issue on Friday, China urged the US to be transparent and provide hard evidence to clarify itself, after US blamed China of "spreading disinformation." The US has a long, infamous history of using and developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) including biological and chemical weapons in other countries, so it would not be a surprise if the US was engaged in such practice in Ukraine, said Chinese experts. If the US fails to clarify itself by providing credible counterevidence, the evidence provided by Russia must be taken seriously, and Russia can further prove that its security concerns are legitimate and reasonable as the US is deploying and developing WMDs in its neighbor countries which seriously threatens the safety of Russia and the whole European continent, analysts said. According to Russia Today on Friday, Russia has called for a UN Security Council meeting to discuss purported US-backed biological weapons programs in Ukraine. Washington has denied that it owns or operates any such biolabs in the country, while Kiev insisted that the facilities were only engaged in civilian research. Moscow's deputy UN envoy Dmitry Polyanskiy announced the move early on Friday, citing a Defense Ministry briefing claiming that the United States and NATO allies ran "military biological programs" in Ukraine.

### 2NC – Solvency – Cyber

#### UN is key to set cyber norms because of Russian involvement

Kiyan, 21 (Olga Kiyan, 11-26-2021, "Establishing Cybersecurity Norms in the United Nations: The Role of U.S.-Russia Divergence," Harvard International Review, <https://hir.harvard.edu/establishing-cybersecurity-norms-in-the-united-nations-the-role-of-u-s-russia-divergence/>, LASA-CSK)

The cyber domain is a relatively new and ill-understood area of international relations. While there have been attempts to relate cybersecurity to nuclear deterrence to determine how to effectively regulate cyberspace, the contrast between these two areas creates the need to establish a new set of norms in order to truly prevent cybercrime. While both methods create environments of fear and uncertainty, the secrecy surrounding cyberweapons as well as their development by intelligence agencies as opposed to the military puts us face to face with a completely new kind of warfare. This, as well as a growing number of international ransomware attacks, makes it especially important to work on international governance measures to better regulate cyberspace. Since 2004, states have participated in UN groups to help craft just these norms and regulations. Most recently, two main approaches have emerged within the United Nations. One approach to establishing these norms has been presented in the form of the OEWG, which emphasizes state sovereignty and non-interference in cyberspace when it comes to developing cooperation in cyberspace. The novel nature of this threat is demonstrated by disagreement on how to best regulate international cyberspace to prevent the escalation to serious conflict. While Russia has pushed for the OEWG as a way to encourage consensus on cyber norms, European states and the United States expressed support for the GGE, which instead promotes an open and free digital environment as opposed to increasing states’ control over the internet. While a lack of consensus is understandable given the novelty of cyber issues, the ability to agree on a unified approach will play a key role in determining how and whether international norms will be developed.

#### Past vehicle cyberattack regulations prove the UN can do the plan

UNECE, 20 (UNECE, 6-24-2020, "UN Regulations on Cybersecurity and Software Updates to pave the way for mass roll out of ‎connected vehicles ‎," No Publication, <https://unece.org/sustainable-development/press/un-regulations-cybersecurity-and-software-updates-pave-way-mass-roll>, LASA-CSK)

The two new UN Regulations, adopted yesterday by UNECE’s World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations, require that measures be implemented across 4 distinct disciplines: Managing vehicle cyber risks; Securing vehicles by design to mitigate risks along the value chain; Detecting and responding to security incidents across vehicle fleet; Providing safe and secure software updates and ensuring vehicle safety is not compromised, introducing a legal basis for so-called “Over-the-Air” (O.T.A.) updates to on-board vehicle software. The regulations will apply to passenger cars, vans, trucks and buses. They will enter into force in January 2021. Japan has indicated that it plans to apply these regulations upon entry into force. The Republic of Korea has adopted a stepwise approach, introducing the provisions of the regulation on Cybersecurity in a national guideline in the second half of 2020, and proceeding with the implementation of the regulation in a second step. In the European Union, the new regulation on cyber security will be mandatory for all new vehicle types from July 2022 and will become mandatory for all new vehicles produced from July 2024. Together, the EU, the Republic of Korea and Japan accounted for some 32 million vehicles produced in 2018, representing just over one third of global production. Given the widespread use of UN Regulations in the automotive sector around the world, the broad adoption of these regulations across the world is expected, among and beyond the 54 Contracting Parties to UNECE’s 1958 Agreement. According to recent research, the need to strengthen automotive cybersecurity will trigger massive investments – increasing from 4.9 billion USD in 2020 to 9.7 billion USD in 2030. The framework offered by the new UN Regulations will spur significant innovation and new economic opportunities among suppliers, IT companies, specialist niche firms and start-ups, particularly in the software development and services market.

#### Cybercrime meetings now prove the UN could do the plan

Falchetta, 4/18 (Tomaso Falchetta, 4-18-2022, "Opening Stages in UN Cybercrime Treaty Talks Reflect Human Rights Risks," Just Security, <https://www.justsecurity.org/81105/opening-stages-in-un-cybercrime-treaty-talks-reflect-human-rights-risks/>, LASA-CSK)

The same day that the United Nations General Assembly convened an emergency special session to respond to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early March, a very different set of negotiations was underway in another U.N. conference room. More than two years after its establishment, the Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purposes (hereinafter the Ad Hoc Committee) held its first substantive session. In what are sure to be contentious negotiations over the next two years, government officials will meet several more times, with the goal of completing a global agreement by early 2024 that aims to facilitate international cooperation and coordination on cybercrime. Our concerns about the treaty predate the first session, and some of these concerns were confirmed by statements made by various States and civil society organizations (CSOs) during the session. While many States (nearly a third of U.N. members) initially opposed the treaty, those same States are actively participating in negotiations, with some even taking up leadership roles. In the meantime, States, CSOs and other stakeholders just submitted their written views on some of the most consequential chapters of the treaty, and those bear close examination as well. The main purpose of the first session was to debate the objectives and scope of the proposed treaty, how it would be structured, and the key elements it would contain. As such, it provided a valuable view into where states stand on the potential treaty, what it may aim to achieve, and its political viability.

#### UN norms are key to accountability of OCOs

Meyer, 21 (Paul Meyer, 1-29-2021, "An international response to offensive cyber operations is long overdue," Policy Options, <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2021/an-international-response-to-offensive-cyber-operations-is-long-overdue/>, LASA-CSK)

Unlike other forms of military operations, states have been extremely secretive about their use of offensive cyber operations and to date have only publicly acknowledged them with respect to non-state targets (such as the Islamic State). State-conducted cyber operations have also caused massive, detrimental impacts on “innocent bystanders” as was the case with the state-originated “Not Petya” (Russia) and “Wanna Cry” (North Korea) cyber operations. It is the threat of wide-ranging computer network attack operations that have prompted what diplomatic efforts to date have been made in the United Nations to respond. Since 1998, the UN General Assembly has been discussing “norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.” In 2015, an expert group report enumerated 11 voluntary norms that should govern state behaviour. Prominent among these norms is the non-targeting by cyber means of critical infrastructure on which the public depends. The 2015 norms represent a good basis for elaborating co-operative security measures, but the revival of “great power rivalry” has led to a bifurcation of the UN process on cyber security, with both the launch of a further expert group and the creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group. The Open-Ended Working Group is considering a draft report before its final meeting in March. Recently a group of states have proposed a “Programme of Action” outcome, which would have a political rather than legal status, but would enable the existing 11 norms to be codified and provided with institutional support to promote their implementation. Specifically, the proposal would create a permanent forum at the UN with annual meetings, secretariat support and periodic review conferences. Importantly, it would consolidate once more UN work into a single, inclusive body rather than stumble on with parallel processes. After decades of UN consideration, many states and non-governmental stakeholders are eager to have in place a set of agreed “norms of responsible state behaviour” complemented by an institutionalized process to monitor implementation. Several non-governmental stakeholders have been active in generating proposals for its consideration. As “accountability” has been a concept largely absent from the intergovernmental discussions, ICT4Peace (an NGO I am affiliated with) has proposed a “Cyber Peer Review” mechanism that would provide for a state-led process for scrutinizing state behaviour. It would also allow for inputs from concerned non-governmental entities. Canada has been among the more active states in the work of the UN’s Open Ended Working Group, having submitted well-received proposals to provide practical guidance as to how states can operationalize the existing norms as well as highlighting the gendered impact of malicious cyber activity. It is also one of the 47 states sponsoring the “Programme of Action” proposal.

#### Russia and China are willing and key to establishing norms that eliminate space threats

Skibba, 5/10 (Ramin Skibba, master’s degree in science communication at UCSC, 05-10-2022, "Delegates at the United Nations Have Begun Forging New Rules for Space," Wired, <https://www.wired.com/story/delegates-at-the-united-nations-have-begun-forging-new-rules-for-space/>, LASA-CSK)

Harris’ pledge could be a key step toward negotiating new international rules for space, a process that began this week at the United Nations office in Geneva, Switzerland, where the first of four high-profile meetings is taking place. Delegations from some 50 countries have come together to discuss the greatest threats to space activities, including from satellite-destroying missile tests and space technologies that can be used as weapons, and to explore what kinds of rules or norms could reduce those threats. On Monday, Canadian officials announced that they’re joining the US in its pledge. “There’s a good display of goodwill and broad engagement. I think there’s points of consensus on what needs to be done. We need to find common understandings of how international laws apply in space,” says Jessica West, a senior researcher at the research institute Project Ploughshares based in Waterloo, Ontario, who’s attending the meeting. (Many representatives from nongovernmental organizations and from the space industry have come to Geneva as observers.) In 1967, three emerging space powers, the US, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, hammered out the Outer Space Treaty, which sought to encourage the peaceful exploration of space for the benefit of all peoples. But more than half a century later, the treaty’s gaps stick out. It prohibits nuclear weapons in space, for example, but says nothing about other potential weapons, such as non-nuclear missiles, West says. Last year, UK diplomats got the UN process rolling, proposing an "open-ended working group” to develop new norms for behavior in space. This week marks the group’s inaugural meeting; it is start of the first major effort to craft such policies since the 1967 treaty. It will be followed by another meeting in September, and two more in 2023. This week’s meeting, chaired by Chilean diplomat Hellmut Lagos, highlights how international laws on Earth can inform the creation of new rules for space, so that negotiators don’t have to reinvent the wheel. “Probably aviation and the law of the sea are the two domains that have the most similarities to outer space. The laws and principles cannot be applied in a copy-and-paste sort of manner, but they can certainly be analogized,” says Almudena Azcárate Ortega, a space security researcher at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a speaker at the meeting. She cites the principle of “due regard”—basically an international Golden Rule—which requires countries to be considerate of others’ interests while conducting their own activities. Flinging satellite shrapnel into orbit seems to violate that concept. International humanitarian law—rules that apply during a conflict between nations—state that one can’t attack civilians or civilian infrastructure. That could matter in space too. “You cannot target a civilian object. You can only target military objectives, and then you have to identify what those things are. A hospital or a school is always protected, but a bridge or a communication center might sometimes be military and sometimes civilian,” says Cassandra Steer, an expert on space law and space security at the Australian National University in Canberra and a speaker at the meeting. The idea of “proportionality,” which prohibits attacks on objects that mainly have civilian use and yield little military advantage, should be applied to space as well, she argues. That makes for a thorny debate for space diplomats, considering the abundance of “dual-use” technologies, Azcárate Ortega says. “Dual use” refers to things like GPS and Earth-imaging satellites, which have numerous everyday uses but which military clients take advantage of as well. (She distinguishes those from “dual-purpose” devices, like a robotic arm intended for servicing spacecraft or removing a derelict craft from orbit, which could be repurposed as a weapon against an adversary’s satellite.) There’s plenty of room for more norms in this area, West says, including rules focused on transparency, such as notifying others when using a new satellite-servicing or debris-collecting technology. Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, which has already had repercussions in space, is casting a shadow over the meeting. Earlier this year, Russian officials pushed to postpone the meeting, which was first planned for February, shortly after Russia staged a November anti-satellite test that produced debris that nearly nicked the International Space Station, and during the buildup of their forces along the Ukrainian border. The war in Ukraine also provided a glimpse of how commercial satellites could get embroiled in a war and how satellite signals could be jammed or spoofed. For the past few years, Russian and Chinese diplomats have sought to advance a treaty preventing the placement of weapons in space. But they made little progress with it. The US blocked that effort, without offering any alternatives. While no destructive weapons have yet been launched into space, Chinese and Russian fears of US weapons in orbit aren’t unfounded: Some US policymakers, led by Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, have called for developing and deploying missiles in space. The US has not been a leader on arms control in space, Steer says—until Harris’ recent declaration that the nation will refrain from anti-satellite missile tests. While some delegations, including China’s and Russia’s, would rather see legally binding treaties, voluntary declarations that most governments will agree to could establish a norm that might lead to more formal agreements later. On just the first day of the Geneva meeting, representatives from many countries had already spoken up about the need for peace in space, including those from Mexico, Austria, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka. The fact that delegations from countries without many spacecraft are actively participating isn’t surprising, considering how much space security matters for everyone. Millions of people around the world depend on satellites for navigation, communication, broadband, and finance, Steer says. These spacecraft are vulnerable to collisions from the thousands of known chunks of large debris that already clog much-used orbits, plus the millions of bits of untrackable smaller fragments. A conflict that begins in—or extends into—space, especially one involving the US, Russia, or China, would surely worsen the situation. The rest of the week’s talks include presentations by Steer, Azcárate Ortega, and others about terrestrial laws that could serve as a guide as negotiators move on from discussions to recommendations. If all goes well, delegates will agree on a consensus document at the end of the week, which could be a starting point for September’s meeting. While UN processes run slowly and can be politically charged, Azcárate Ortega feels optimistic. “This seems to be moving forward after many years in which nothing really happened, or people talked but there weren’t concrete proposals,” she says. “All sides of the geopolitical spectrum are coming to the table. I don’t expect everyone to agree from the get-go, but it’s very encouraging.”

### 2NC – Solvency – Enforcement

#### The counterplan fiats the whole UN, that includes the Security Council. That means the decision is binding.

Joyner, 17 (Dan Joyner, 1-9-2017, "Legal Bindingness of Security Council Resolutions Generally, and Resolution 2334 on the Israeli Settlements in Particular," EJIL: Talk!, <https://www.ejiltalk.org/legal-bindingness-of-security-council-resolutions-generally-and-resolution-2334-on-the-israeli-settlements-in-particular/>, LASA-CSK)

I thought this would be a good opportunity to write briefly to clarify that the legal obligation for U.N. Charter states parties to comply with the decisions of the Security Council, contained in Article 24 and 25 of the Charter, is not contingent upon the Council’s acting in exercise of its Chapter VII powers. Any decision of the Security Council is legally binding upon all U.N. member states, whether or not the text of the resolution explicitly references Chapter VII.

#### Security Council decisions bind all member states – including opposing votes

Divac, 5 (Marko Divac, 11-1-2005, "Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ," OUP Academic, <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/16/5/879/496072>, LASA-CSK)

Ratione materiae, the binding effect of SC resolutions belongs to the realm of international peace and security38 and includes enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,39 but is not limited to that.40 Since just about any significant international event or situation can be characterized as a threat to peace and security,41 the scope of the SC’s binding powers, if combined with an overriding binding force, would make the SC a dauntingly powerful organ. Whether a specific SC resolution is binding is determined by the language used in it, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked, etc.,42 all with the purpose of establishing the intent of the SC.43 The precise content of the binding effect is left to the SC itself,44 but the Court has found certain ‘implicit’ legal effects and, inversely, put some limits on the effects45 when these conflict with the principles and purposes in Chapter I of the UN Charter.46 This limitation is too vague to have much practical value in the absence of any organ competent to review the validity of SC resolutions.47 Ratione personae, an SC decision may bind all UN Member States, including ‘those members of the Security Council which voted against it and those Members of the United Nations who are not members of the Council’.48 As for non-Member States, the most coherent interpretation of a difficult passage in the Namibia opinion rejects any direct binding effect.49 This interpretation respects the basic principle that treaties only bind parties, and avoids the difficult question of whether the UN Charter is subject to special rules within the law of treaties. It also leads to the same practical outcome since just about every state is now a member of the UN.

#### But, the plan isn’t binding on other NATO countries!

Sponeck, 9 (Hans Von Sponeck, 2-17-2009, "The UN and NATO: Which Security and for Whom?," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, <https://www.wagingpeace.org/the-un-and-nato-which-security-and-for-whom>, LASA-CSK)

21st century NATO incompatible with UN Charter In 1999, NATO acknowledged that it was seeking to orient itself according to a new fundamental strategic concept. From a narrow military defense alliance it was to become a broad based alliance for the protection of the vital resources’ needs of its members. Besides the defense of member states’ borders, it set itself new purposes such as assured access to energy sources and the right to intervene in “movements of large numbers of persons” and in conflicts far from the boarders of NATO countries. The readiness of the new alliance to include other countries, particularly those that had previously been part of the Soviet Union, shows how the character of this military alliance has altered. In the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations was declared to be NATO’s legally binding framework. However, the United Nations monopoly of the use of force, especially as specified in Article 51 of the Charter, was no longer accepted according to the 1999 NATO doctrine. NATO’s territorial scope, until then limited to the Euro-Atlantic region, was expanded by its member to encompass the whole world in keeping with a strategic context that was global in its sweep. At the Budapest summit, on 3 April 2008, NATO declared that it intended to meet the emerging challenges of the twenty-first century “with all the possible means of its mission.” It added that the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty of the founding countries had been ratified by the current parliaments and thereby had become international law. This did not hold for later NATO strategies and doctrines.

### 2NC – Solvency – AT Military Key

#### International law grants the UN military enforcement capabilities

ICRC, 96 (ICRC, 5-15-1996, "UN, Guidelines for UN Forces," ICRC News, <https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/un-guidelines-un-forces>, LASA-CSK)

1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.

### 2NC – Solvency – AT UN Bad

#### “UN bad” cuts both ways --- the aff can only use force if it’s supported by the UN, so their gridlock also undermines NATO effectiveness

Daalder, 99 (Ivo H. Daalder, President, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 3-1-1999, "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force," Brookings, [https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato-the-un-and-the-use-of-force](https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato-the-un-and-the-use-of-force/), LASA-CSK)

Of the many issues relating to the threat and use of force by NATO that have divided the allies, none have been as contentious as the so-called mandate question, i.e., under what authority or on which legal basis can NATO threaten or use military force in other than a collective defense contingency. At the outset of this debate, most allies believed that NATO should not act in this type of situation without an explicit mandate or authorization from the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Allied leaders agreed as much at their 1994 Brussels Summit: “We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE.” In recent years, however, there has been a growing division within the Alliance about the role and authority, if any, of the UN and other organizations in legitimizing or mandating the use of force by NATO. Two competing perspectives have emerged—a French perspective that gives the UN Security Council the primary role in authorizing NATO’s use of force; and a U.S. perspective that essentially argues that NATO has the right to use force whenever the interests of its members so require. The French perspective is based on the notion that the use force in international affairs, by a single state or group of states like NATO, is ultimately governed by the United Nations Charter. The UN Security Council is empowered by the Charter to determine the existence of any threat to or breach of peace (Article 39). At the same time, the Charter recognizes that states have the right to defend themselves individually and collectively (Article 51) and that regional arrangements or agencies can maintain peace and security within their region, provided they do so in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (Article 52). The first purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security (Article 1) and one of its key principles requires members to refrain from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” (Article 2). Given this legal foundation, it follows that NATO can resort to force in self-defense, either of a member state that is attacked or of a non-member state so long as the government of that state requests NATO’s assistance. The former situation falls squarely within the collective defense commitment of the Washington treaty; the latter, as the case of Bosnia demonstrated, follows logically from the right of collective self-defense. At the same time, NATO cannot use force against another UN member state without its government’s consent if the action is not itself in defense of another UN member state unless the action is specifically authorized by the UN Security Council. That is the import of both Article 2 (which prohibits the use force against the territory or political independence of another state) and the proviso of Article 52 which limits action by regional arrangements such as NATO to those that are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. It follows from this reasoning that NATO can only use force in non-Article 5 contingencies either if it is invited to do so by the state involved or if it is explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, France (with support from some allies) has insisted that the revised NATO strategic concept should explicitly predicate the use of force by NATO in these circumstances on the Alliance receiving a mandate from the UN Security Council.

### 2NC – Solvency – AT Countries Don’t Follow

#### Fiat! +

#### Having the UN do the plan encourages adherence to the future reform agenda

Koliward, 21 (Priya Koliwad, 10-06-2021, "Is the United Nations Still a Relevant International Body? — The World Mind ," World Mind, <https://www.theworldmind.org/home/2021/10/26/is-the-united-nations-still-a-relevant-international-body>, LASA-CSK)

The United Nations is still relevant, especially since the world has become interconnected and where current global problems, such as hunger and climate change have emerged, thus the UN’s collective efforts are essential to tackle these modern challenges. The UN has attempted to improve its structure, however, the lack of willingness by member states has impeded the UN’s progress. The reform agenda should be directed towards strengthening the UN’s outstanding thinking and could be a solution that would encourage \ member states to be involved in building such a network which could ultimately lead to better adherence to the UN’s structural reform agenda. Clearly, it is relatively complicated to determine the measures that can generate the will and it is not going to be easy to design a new UN once these measures are discovered either. However, if the member states notice that the only alternative without the UN is to address the growing number of complicated interconnected and wide scope challenges by themselves. They will be left with no choice but to accept the fact that it might be better to collectively repair the UN rather than be left alone to face the dramatic challenges of today's world.

### 2NC – Solvency – AT Russia

#### UN ensures Russian cooperation whereas NATO is perceived as forwarding western interests

Remler, 20 (Philip Remler, 1-22-2020, "Russia at the United Nations: Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/22/russia-at-united-nations-law-sovereignty-and-legitimacy-pub-80753>, LASA-CSK)

In analyzing how Russia goes about promoting its status as a global power at the UN, the concept of international law stands out as Russia’s most important battle line. In speech after speech, both Putin and Lavrov have stressed the importance of upholding international law. Lavrov often contrasts this law with an alternative that he maintains the West is promoting to expand Western interests and values; in a 2018 address, for example, he charged: “Today we can trace a tendency to substitute for international law, as we all know it, some kind of ‘rules-based order.’ That is what a series of our creative Western friends call it.”2

## Perm

### 2NC – AT: PDB

#### The counterplan restores UN leadership, but only works if NATO doesn’t involve itself in the area of the aff

Sponeck, 9 (Hans Von Sponeck, 2-17-2009, "The UN and NATO: Which Security and for Whom?," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, <https://www.wagingpeace.org/the-un-and-nato-which-security-and-for-whom>, LASA-CSK)

UN mandate makes NATO obsolete Any evaluation of the UN/NATO pact must take into account that NATO is a relic of the Cold War; that NATO, as a Western alliance, is regarded with considerable mistrust by the other 166 United Nations member states; that a primary NATO aim is to assert, by military means, its energy and power interests in opposition to other United Nations member states and that the United States, a founding member of the NATO community, in the most unscrupulous ways, has disparaged the United Nations and broken international law. (7) Finally, it must be pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations provides for a Military Staff Committee, whose mandate is to advise and assist the United Nations Security Council “on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security.” (8) If it is thus a matter of NATO countries looking after the well-being of the international community and not the interests of small group of states, then the United Nations mandate makes NATO obsolete!

#### NATO crowds out the UN – proves the perm wrecks UN effectiveness

Patomäki , 18 (Heikki Patomäki, 07-30-2018, "Kosovo and the end of the United Nations?," Manchester Open Hive, https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526137517.00010, LASA-CSK)

The UN’s General Assembly has been the only truly global public political forum for which all states are equal. It has provided a framework for decolonisation and the pursuit of the reform of international institutions. The UN Charter has provided seeds for a claim made on behalf of an alternative organising principle of world affairs, namely for a democratic community of states, with equal voting rights in the General Assembly of nation states, openly and collectively regulating international life in accordance with the UN Charter and human rights conventions.80 Despite its many practical shortcomings and problematic state-centrism, the UN has thus provided a forum, constituted by legal procedures and rules, where differences have encountered each other in a peaceful manner and where, sometimes, common policies on a number of issues have been worked out. The domestication of the UN by the US has severely damaged both the moral basis of UN pluralism and the legal procedures and rules on which the UN has been based. After the events of the last fifteen years, very little of the spirit of the UN Charter is left; and NATO is seriously aspiring to the role of the global security organisation. There are also very few signs to indicate that the US would allow a rejuvenation or a democratisation of the UN, or even grant more autonomy to the present UN. Nor is it easy to organise resistance against US hegemony in the struggle for transformations within the UN without becoming just another enemy for the US, given its economic privileges and interests, its Manichean tendencies, and the entanglement of its public politics with the functioning of the short-sighted, self-referential and simulatory commercial media. It is likely that the consequent confrontation would quickly bring any progress made to a halt.

## Theory

### 2NC – AT: Multi-Actor Fiat

#### We meet – the UN is one actor

Auto, 12 (Emilia Autio, 12-4-2012, "One UN for Development? The United Nations as an Actor in International Development," No Publication, <https://trepo.tuni.fi/handle/10024/84089>, LASA-CSK)

Based on the analysis, the UN can be seen as an independent actor, its many different functions and especially its expertise in development making it an authoritative actor in international development. The organization is both supporting the work of its member states and actively promoting ideas important to its own agenda. The ideas presented already in the UN charter in 1945 are still evident in the work of the organization and guide the work of the organization over the often conflicting interests of the member states. The UN has various means to affect the decision-making of the member states and, thus, contribute to the development activities not only by regulating but also constituting understandings of development. One of the most important result of this thesis is therefore the abundance of action apparent in the work of the UN in development, presenting the organization not so much as an employee of the member states but as an independent, active authority. The results, therefore, are in line with the core ideas of the bureaucracy theory.

#### Multi-actor fiat is good for education – doing security cooperation through international organizations like NATO, the EU, and the UN is a core controversy with expansive lit bases

#### C/I – we get multi-actor fiat with solvency advocates – solves all of their offense

#### Reject the arg not the team

#### The UN is a single actor

Shraga, 7 (Daphna Shraga, 11-8-2007, "The United Nations as an actor bound by international humanitarian law," Taylor & Francis, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533319808413719>, LASA-CSK)

The United Nations as an actor bound by international humanitarian law. Although for many years the United Nations has been reluctant to formally recognize the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to UN peacekeeping operations, the changing role and nature of UN peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s made this recognition imperative. In discussing the principle and scope of application of IHL to UN forces, the article examines the main arguments in the UN‐ICRC debate; the UN undertaking in the Status of Forces Agreements to observe and respect the spirit and principles of IHL Conventions; the international responsibility of the United Nations for activities of UN forces, and the relationship between the applicability of IHL to UN forces and the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. The article argues that IHL applies to UN forces when they are actively engaged in military operations as combatants, but that its applicability is mutatis‐mutandis, taking into consideration the nature and legal status of the United Nations Organization and its capacity to be bound by its provisions.

### 2NC – AT: International Fiat

#### International fiat is good –

#### Global citizenry – international cp make us learn about relative capabilities and raises global awareness – accesses more topic literature and education, and makes us better, less xenophobic citizens in light of a culture of dissent

#### Neg flex – Allows full testing of the aff, forces them to think critically and corrects side biases

#### Real world – burden-sharing, joint operations, think tanks, NGOs, and the UN all prove policymakers inside and outside the government choose between two states

#### C/I – we get international fiat with solvency advocates – solves all of their offense

#### Reject the arg not the team

### 2NC – NATO v UN

#### The counterplan is not a minor tweak. The two organizations serve entirely different purposes

Boothby, 99 (Derek Boothby, 07-14-1999, " NATO and the United Nations," No Publication, <https://www.csdr.org/95Book/Boothby.htm>, LASA-CSK)

NATO and the U.N. are two organizations trying to work together despite the fact that they have very different philosophies: NATO is an organization designed to fight war, if necessary, in order to defend peace; whereas the U.N. is an organization designed to avoid war in order to maintain peace. In other words, the effectiveness of NATO is directly proportional to the amount of military force available for use; whereas the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping is inversely proportional to the amount of military force used.

#### They are diametrically opposed in purpose and mandate

Sponeck, 9 (Hans Von Sponeck, 2-17-2009, "The UN and NATO: Which Security and for Whom?," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, <https://www.wagingpeace.org/the-un-and-nato-which-security-and-for-whom>, LASA-CSK)

A comparison of the mandates of the United Nations and of NATO shows clearly how opposed the purposes of these two institutions are. In the 63 years of its existence, the United Nations mandate has remained the same.

The United Nations was created to promote and maintain worldwide peace. NATO exists to assure the self-interest of a group of 26 UN member countries. Its mandate, grounded in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, originally dealt with the defense of its member states. At the end of the Cold War, in 1989, its mandate appeared to have been fulfilled. Nevertheless, the NATO members wanted to maintain this Western alliance. This launched the search for a new role for NATO.

## NB

### 2NC – Politics NB

#### UN avoids politics.

Tingley and Tomz, 12 (Dustin Tingley, Harvard University, and Michael Tomz, Stanford University, 11-2012, "How does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion?," University of Virginia, <https://politics.virginia.edu/sites/politics.virginia.edu/files/Tomz-LLB.pdf>, LASA-CSK)

Publics do not have complete information about foreign crises, and therefore rely on domestic and international actors for cues about the appropriate course of action. The UNSC could play an important role in this process. By authorizing the use of force, the UNSC could convince domestic audiences that there must be a good case for military action. A UNSC resolution could change peoples’ estimates about the material costs and benefits of using force. An affirmative UNSC vote could help convince domestic audiences that the foreign crisis is genuine and severe, such that failure to take military action could threaten the material interests of the United States and/or other countries. An affirmative vote could also suggest that the human and financial costs of military action would be low, either in absolute terms or relative to the anticipated benefits. Finally, an affirmative vote could signal to domestic audiences that the probability of military success would be high, or at least sufficiently likely to warrant a positive recommendation. In all these ways, a UNSC resolution could alter the public’s calculations about whether the benefits of war would outweigh the costs. A UNSC resolution could also signal that military action would be morally appropriate, independent of the material costs and benefits. A positive vote in the Security Council could be seen as confirmation that some country has committed a moral wrong, such as an act of aggression against its own citizens or a foreign target, and that the international community has a duty to respond. The vote might also suggest that war would be “fair” – an action to which nearly all countries could consent, rather than a war that would serve the parochial interests of particular countries. Finally, a war undertaken with the blessing of the UNSC would be legal, whereas war without UNSC approval might be seen as a (potentially immoral) violation of international law. Thus, UNSC resolutions could prove influential not only by conveying information about material costs and benefits, but also by signaling whether military action would be morally justified.

#### Public faith in UN burden sharing is high

Tingley and Tomz, 12 (Dustin Tingley, Harvard University, and Michael Tomz, Stanford University, 11-2012, "How does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion?," University of Virginia, <https://politics.virginia.edu/sites/politics.virginia.edu/files/Tomz-LLB.pdf>, LASA-CSK)

UNSC resolutions could affect public opinion not only by signaling that military action is warranted, but also by implying that other countries will share the burden. Citizens may think the likelihood of success is higher if countries fight collectively than if their own country acts alone. Moreover, citizens may expect to pay less if coalition partners share the human and financial costs of defeating an adversary. For these reasons, the public should be more enthusiastic when they believe that other countries will help. By raising expectations about multilateral action, UNSC resolutions could, therefore, increase public support for war. If UNSC resolutions sway public opinion by signaling that other countries will contribute, several patterns should appear in the data. First, the belief that other countries will contribute should be higher when the UNSC has voted for war than when it has not. Second, public expectations about the human and financial costs of war should be lower, and public expectations about the probability of success should be higher, when the UNSC has voted for war than when it has not.

### 2NC – RCA NB

#### NATO action guarantees oppositional blocks that ensure backlash. UN action doesn’t.

Laurenti 98, Executive Director of Policy Studies, UNA-USA (Jeffrey, “Different Security Roles: The Security Council and NATO,” Global Policy, <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/laurenti.htm)//BB>

In contrast to the NATO treaty (that is, the North Atlantic Treaty as it was written, not as some in Washington might wish to reinvent it), the U.N. Charter creates a comprehensive security organization. The North Atlantic Treaty is quite intentionally one-dimensional: responding collectively to an "armed attack" upon the home territory of any of its members, in exercise of inherent "self-defense" as recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (and even that, only till the Security Council can "take measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" in that situation). NATO's mission is narrowly one of repelling illegal armed force (against its own members, of course)--the restricted scope that some contributors to this forum would crabbedly apply to the U.N. as well.

The U.N. Security Council's mandate is far broader--dealing with ANY "threat to the peace". Add to that its functions in peacekeeping, peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of other parts of the U.N. in building the economic and social foundations of peaceful relations, and you have a multidimensional and comprehensive security system.

Sure, it's weak and fragile. But the notion purveyed by some on both sides of the Potomac that NATO should supersede the Security Council and launch military operations against other states on its own ukase (in order to get around the squeamishness of Russia and China about intervening in internal affairs) is risky and misguided. The desire of some U.S. officials to get NATO's member states formally to assert such a power may (and, I would suggest, should) alarm many contributors to this discussion group. It should even alarm the few political leaders in Washington farsighted enough to think about possible consequences--e.g., the risk that nations outside of NATO may conclude they need to band together into rival blocs to raise the cost of Western interventions.

#### China and Russia lash out in response to NATO BUT are proponents of UN policies

Ku, 4/7 (Julian G. Ku, Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Law at Hofstra University, 4-7-2022, "China Has Ditched Its Own Principles to Back Russia," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/07/china-ditched-principles-ukraine-russia-use-of-force/>, LASA-CSK)

“China always opposes the use of force in international relations.” This boilerplate statement, frequently repeated by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflects Beijing’s long-standing, publicly stated opposition to the use of military force outside the limitations imposed by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. It is a fundamental principle of its approach to international law and a significant feature of its self-portrayal as neutral, peaceful state in contrast to the United States. Yet China, which has repeatedly refused to criticize Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, appears to have abandoned its long-standing legal and diplomatic position. Beijing’s silence on Ukraine may represent a temporary accommodation of its most important geopolitical ally, but it could also represent a meaningful shift in the Chinese government’s views on the propriety of the use of force. Either way, China’s silence as Russia blatantly violates one of its most cherished principles of international law deserves both criticism and careful attention if it also represents a shift toward a more aggressive and dangerous Chinese foreign policy. Since its admission into the United Nations in 1971, China has emerged as a reliable defender of the centrality of the world body and the U.N. Charter to the conduct of international relations. In a revealing 2005 position paper on proposals for U.N. reform, China lauded the United Nations’ “indispensable role in international affairs.” It made such statements even as it rejected calls at the time to endorse a “Responsibility to Protect” principle that would allow the use of force to prevent humanitarian atrocities. The U.N. Security Council, China argued at that time, “is the only body that can decide the use of force.” This position is consistent with both prior and subsequent Chinese government statements. For instance, even before it joined the U.N. but after it had diplomatically split with the Soviet Union, China publicly condemned the Soviet Union’s use of force in Czechoslovakia in 1968. And unlike its current silence on Russia, the Chinese foreign ministry didn’t hesitate to call the U.S. military action in Panama a “military invasion” that “constitutes an infringement against a sovereign state of the third world and violates the norms of international law and the aims and purposes of the United Nations Charter.” This condemnation was made even though China and Panama had no diplomatic relations at that time, with Panama instead recognizing Taiwan. A decade later, the Chinese government aggressively opposed NATO’s military intervention against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis and joined only Russia and Namibia in supporting a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have condemned NATO’s use of force. As China’s U.N. ambassador declared months earlier, NATO’s use of force “violated the purposes, principles, and relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, as well as international law and widely acknowledged norms governing relations between states.”

### 2NC – Internal NB – Cyber-Specific

#### New UN cyber policy is key to resolving future conflict

Hagebölling , 4/12 (David Hagebölling, 4-12-2022, "The Geopolitical Struggle for Technology Leadership," No Publication, <https://ip-quarterly.com/en/geopolitical-struggle-technology-leadership>, LASA-CSK)

Fourth, amidst the growth of cyber capabilities as a destabilizing force in international security, the norms and rules for how to govern them are now at a crossroads. In the past, a sequence of six UN Governmental Groups of Expert (GGE) has worked toward defining norms of responsible state behavior and affirmed the applicability of international law to cyberspace. In 2019, the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was established as a de facto parallel track to the GGE, mainly on Russia’s initiative. The agreement on the OEWG’s final report reached less than a year ago marked the first time that consensus, including on language and recommendations from the GGE, has been reached in a process open to all UN member states. However, major divergences on the way forward remain, particularly on questions of implementation and multi-stakeholderism in the ongoing diplomatic initiatives. A French-Egyptian Program of Action aimed at invigorating cooperation in a permanent United Nations forum is at risk of fading into obscurity if not urgently advanced this year. Above all this looms the possibility that Russia further escalates its use of cyber capabilities against Ukraine and—possibly inadvertently—other countries, which would weigh heavily on the prospect for progress on cyber diplomacy at the United Nations.

# Aff

## Solvency

### 2AC – Solvency – AI

#### Political fights and lack of AI integration into systems wrecks interoperability

Fournier-Tombs, 21 (Eleonore Fournier-Tombs, 5-31-2021, "The United Nations needs to start regulating the 'Wild West' of artificial intelligence," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/the-united-nations-needs-to-start-regulating-the-wild-west-of-artificial-intelligence-161257>, LASA-CSK)

Conversely, the lack of regulation at the United Nations can be considered a challenge for agencies seeking to adopt more effective and novel technologies. As such, many systems seem to have been developed and later abandoned without being integrated into actual decision-making systems. An example of this is the Jetson tool, which was developed by UNHCR to predict the arrival of internally displaced persons to refugee camps in Somalia. The tool does not appear to have been updated since 2019, and seems unlikely to transition into the humanitarian organization’s operations. Unless, that is, it can be properly certified by a new regulatory system. Trust in AI is difficult to obtain, particularly in United Nations work, which is highly political and affects very vulnerable populations. The onus has largely been on data scientists to develop the credibility of their tools.

#### Slaughterbots prove unanimity makes UN regulation of AI impossible

Shaed, 21 (Sam Shead, 12-17-2021, “UN talks to ban ‘slaughterbots’ collapsed — here’s why that matters,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/22/un-talks-to-ban-slaughterbots-collapsed-heres-why-that-matters.html>, LASA-CSK)

A UN conference failed to agree on banning the use and development of so-called “slaughterbots” at a meeting in Geneva last week, raising alarm bells among experts in artificial intelligence, military strategy, disarmament and humanitarian law. Slaughterbots are weapons that select and apply force to targets without human intervention. Instead, they make their decisions with artificial intelligence software, which is essentially a series of algorithms. For the first time ever this year, the bulk of the 125 nations that belong to the United Nations’ Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) said they wanted new laws to be introduced on killer robots. However, some countries that are developing these weapons including the U.S. and Russia, were in opposition, making a unilateral agreement impossible. The U.K. and several other nations also objected. “We would have liked to have seen everyone get behind that,” Emilia Javorsky, a physician scientist who leads the Future of Life Institute’s advocacy program on autonomous weapons, told CNBC. “All it takes is one,” she added. The conference concluded Friday, with the group pledging to “intensify” discussions and consider possible steps that are acceptable to all. The fact that the CCW failed to agree on anything concrete last week was hailed as an “epic failure” by Javorsky. “It is now blatantly clear this forum — whose unanimity requirement makes it easily derailed by any state with a vested interest — is utterly incapable of taking seriously, let alone meaningfully addressing, the urgent threats posed by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence,” she said. Verity Coyle, a senior advisor at Amnesty International, said in a statement that the window of opportunity to regulate killer robots grows ever smaller as research and testing of these weapons presses forward. “The CCW has once again demonstrated its inability to make meaningful progress – it’s now time that committed states take the lead on an external process that can deliver the type of breakthrough we’ve previously seen on landmines and cluster munitions,” she said.

### 2AC – Solvency – Biotech

#### UN biotech regulation wrecks developing countries widening the tech gap

Miller, 96 (Henry I. Miller, Robert Wesson Fellow of scientific philosophy & public policy, Hoover Institution Consulting Professor at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, 7-1-1996, "Biotechnology and the UN: New challenges, new failures," Nature, <https://www.nature.com/articles/nbt0796-831>, LASA-CSK)

The overregulation of technology, though damaging to industrialized countries, is particularly devastating to developing countries because it acts as yet another, and formidable entry barrier to R&D. Thus, the UN's design's on biotechnology are likely to increase further the income gap between the "have" and "have not" nations, which more than doubled between 1960 and 1991. Poorly crafted regulatory proposals constitute a lose-lose proposition for the developing world. Virtually every field trial of every new biotechnology derived variant of rice, cassava, maize, wheat, sweet potato, or other plant would require an environmental assessment. These schemes would divert scarce resources to the regulation of activities that are largely of negligible risk, send inaccurate messages about risk to the public and to politicians, and impose a "tax" on innovation which is based on the excessively regulated techniques. These approaches also make new products artificially expensive to use, test, and produce: New crop plant varieties must be adapted to local conditions and the expense of testing them would become prohibitive. Thus, unnecessary case by case 834 review would diminish the degree and speed of technology diffusion to the developing world, developing countries would be prevented from participating in worldwide technological trends, and the technology gap that already exists between the industrialized and developing countries would widen further. There are bitter ironies in the demand that the developing world adopt unscientific, technique-based and anti-innovative regulatory approaches. First, the clamor usually originates from regulators or activists in industrialized countries who both regard Third-world regulation as an opportunity to validate their minority view of genetic engineering as manifesting unique risks and see prospects for becoming players on a larger stage. Second, such policies preferentially undermine research on precisely the kinds of low-value-added but important products that are most needed in developing countries- safer and more nutritious foods, improved bioremediation agents, and alternatives to chemical pesticides and fertilizers. At the same time, these poorly conceived policies exact a high cost, they are unlikely to afford any increment in environmental or public health protection

### 2AC – Solvency – Cyber

#### Perm solves – UN fails without the US pushing for cyber norms

Herman, 21 (Slate Herman, J.D. Candidate, University of Colorado Law School, 1-29-2021, "Cybersecurity and the U.N. Charter: A Square Peg in a Round Hole," Colorado Technology Law Journal, <https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=701>, LASA-CSK)

In this note I contend that the U.N. Charter fails to adequately address non-state actors or provide effective alternatives to armed conflict. The question of how to correctly classify these actions under international law then arises. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter imbues nations with the power of self-defense against an armed attack.[20] The ancient concept of an armed attack creates significant ambiguity when applied to the revolutionary concept of cyberwarfare. The use of armed forces and other similar definitions are inadequate in their understanding of cyberoperations. The U.N. Charter also fails to prescribe appropriate responses to cyber-attacks and splits appropriate action into two categories, neither of which allow cyber operations to be classified correctly. Current international law does not adequately address the growing problem of cyberwarfare. Specifically, the blind spots created by Articles 2(4), 41, 42, and 51 of the U.N. Charter in failing to address cyber warfare, coupled with lack of responsibility for non-state actors expose the United States to significant risk.[21] The United States must be active in pushing the U.N. to consider new regulations to fix these potholes in the U.N. Charter. Though some governmental bodies seem unwilling to join the discussion surrounding proper international cyberoperations, others leap headlong into the murky topic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) has taken the largest step to adequately define cyber operations and explain how international legal regimes apply to cyberweapons.[22] In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence embarked on a journey to produce a manual on the international law governing cyberwarfare, which became known as the Tallinn Manual.[23] The project collected distinguished practitioners and scholars in an attempt to project how current legal standards would govern this new form of warfare. With its primary focus on wartime action, the Tallinn Manual dives deeply into cyber operations involving the use of force and those that occur in the context of armed conflict.[24] In 2013, this text began serving as a resource for governments and scholars in the legal field.[25] Almost immediately after its publication, the group began work on a second edition of the Tallinn Manual. Released in February 2017, Tallinn 2.0 expanded on the original version and added multiple provisions while updating the original.[26] This manual serves as a background from which I make many of my assumptions and conclusions.

#### Empirics prove China and Russia block all UN attempts at cyberspace international law

Segal, 17 (Adam Segal, 6-29-2017, "The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock. Now What?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/development-cyber-norms-united-nations-ends-deadlock-now-what>, LASA-CSK)

The prospects of developing norms of state behavior in cyberspace have been looking positively bleak recently. The Lazarus Group, which appears to have ties to North Korea, is suspected of being behind the WannaCry ransomware attacks that spread to 150 countries and hobbled the UK’s National Health Service. Russian hackers have been named as the culprits in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and are suspected of being responsible for blackouts in Kiev in 2015 and 2016. This week’s attack, Petya/NotPetyta, first looked like a new version of ransomware, but now seems designed for disruption and destruction. The attack appears to have originated in Ukraine, on the day before a holiday marking the 1996 adoption of that country’s first constitution, so early suspicion is that Moscow is behind the attacks, though this is still highly speculative (Russia itself has also suffered from Petya). Despite the proliferation of state-backed attacks, for a brief window, there did seem to be some forward movement on cyber norms. This week China and Canada agreed not to conduct cyber espionage for commercial gain against each other. Beijing has now signed similar agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and the G-7 and G-20. In 2013, a group of government experts (GGE) at the UN agreed that international law, and especially the UN Charter, applies to state activity cyberspace. In 2015, the same group agreed to four peacetime norms promoted by the United States: states should not interfere with each other’s critical infrastructure; they should not target each other’s computer emergency response teams; they should assist other nations investigating cyberattacks; and they are responsible for actions that originate from their territory. That process seems to have reached a dead end. Last week, Michelle Markoff, deputy coordinator for cyber issues in the State Department published an explanation of the U.S. position at the end of the 2016-2017 GGE process. Markoff’s frustration is palpable, as she writes the current “report falls short of our mandate and doesn’t meets the standard that the previous GGEs have set for us.” The sticking point is the application of international law. The United States wanted to use the report to begin explaining exactly how international law applies in cyberspace, especially in the areas of the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense and the law of state responsibility, including countermeasures. Other participants argued that it was too early in the development of cyberspace to have such deliberations, and would in themselves be destabilizing. They would be “incompatible with the messages the Group should be sending regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention.” Markoff does not call out the obstructionist states by name, but it is safe to assume China and Russia were among them. Beijing has never liked the idea that international law applies to cyberspace, and began walking back the 2013 report almost as soon as the ink was dry. Chinese officials have consistently stressed the UN Charter and the importance of sovereignty without mentioning the rest of international law. During the 2015 meeting of the UN group, China’s representative proposed taking out all references to international law in the upcoming report. In the wake of the DNC hack, Moscow would certainly not support discussions about countermeasures, which might cover U.S. reprisals for hacking and information operations.

### 1AR – Solvency – AT UN Bad Links to Aff

#### NATO doesn’t require UN oversight

Perry , 98 (James T. Perry, 1-1-1998, "," Naval War College Press, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1458&context=ils>, LASA-CSK)

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter13 refers to regional organizations, such as NATO, in the context of appropriate regional action in the maintenance of international peace and security.14 It is in this area that a relationship exists between the two organizations, with ultimate authority centered in the United Nations. Excepting the area of international peace and security, however, the relationship between the UN and NATO is not hierarchical. When the NATO Charter was established in 1949 by the Treaty of Washington,15 it made no mention of any relationship to the Security Council as a "regional arrangement," nor did it contain any provision providing for action only upon the authorization of the Security Council, or for reporting activities "in contemplation." Instead, the Treaty of Washington expressed the obligation of NATO's member states to be that of "collective self,defense" under Article 51 of the UN Charter and, correspondingly, embodied only the obligation to report "measures taken" to the Security Council.16 This formulation was adopted by the United States and its NATO allies because subordination of NATO actions as a regional arrangement to Security Council review in advance during the Cold War would have subjected all actions to Soviet veto. By characterizing NATO's military actions as "collective self,defense" under Article 51, there would be no action of a "regional arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and no prior Security Council review.

## Theory

### 2AC – International Fiat

#### International fiat is a voter. Especially in this case since the aff fiats every major international actor.

#### Limits – 195 countries multiplied by individual agencies makes in-depth engagement and predictability impossible.

#### Aff ground – the aff only gets to fiat the USFG cooperates with NATO, letting the neg fiat the 193 countries of the UN makes the topic impossible for the aff

#### Not real world – no policymaker can decide between two countries international organizations – means no answers in the literature base.

### 2AC – Multi-Actor Fiat

#### Multi-Actor fiat is a voter –

#### Fairness – it fiats 193 of the 195 recognized countries – that’s functionally a fiat the whole world CP

#### Education – No lit base for Kosovo, Western Sahara, and Taiwan solvency deficits

## NB

### 2AC – AT: UN Good NB

#### UN charter outdated and ineffective in carrying out effective policy

Boothby, 99 (Derek Boothby, 07-14-1999, " NATO and the United Nations," No Publication, <https://www.csdr.org/95Book/Boothby.htm>, LASA-CSK)

Personally, I doubt very much that the U.N. should ever be in the business of military peace enforcement. That is a task that should be carried out by fully effective military organizations, such as NATO or groups of states willing to do and capable of doing the job. Such organizations should first be given political license from the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII; the operations should be halted if that political license is subsequently withdrawn. But the U.N. itself has neither the military command systems nor the political cohesion to carry out military-enforcement tasks. Moreover, it is arguable that a U.N. that carried out military peace enforcement--except perhaps in the most unique circumstances--would find itself in much political trouble with its members. In my view, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, as an authority for U.N. peace enforcement, was written for a different era and has little military application to today's world.

#### The UN doesn’t have the scientific expertise to be effective

Juma, 2000 (Calestous Juma, Fall 2000, "The UN's Role in the New Diplomacy," Issues in Science and Technology, <https://issues.org/stalk-4/>, LASA-CSK)

As a new form of international diplomacy develops to deal with a number of emerging issues in which science and technology play a central role, the United Nations (UN) risks being relegated to the sidelines. The influence and effectiveness of diplomats and international civil servants will increasingly depend on the extent to which they can mobilize scientific and technical expertise in their work. This need not require the UN to acquire extensive in-house scientific competence, but the organization–especially the office of the secretary general–must learn to tap advisory services to identify, mobilize, and use the best available expertise. Although a large number of UN agencies, programs, and treaties rely on scientific and technological expertise for their work, they are not designed to receive systematic science advice as a key component of effective performance. In most cases, science is used in the UN to support special interests and political agendas that do not necessarily advance the goals of the organization. But this should not come as a surprise. The UN was founded and grew to prominence in the era of the Cold War, when much of diplomacy was devoted to dealing with threats arising from external aggression. Today, attention is turning to issues such as infectious diseases, environmental degradation, electronic crimes, weapons of mass destruction, and the impacts of new technologies, which in the past would have been the concern of individual nations but have now grown to international stature. The UN’s capacity to deal with these questions must also grow. What is notable about the UN is that it includes organizations that cater to a wide range of jurisdictions but not to the growing community of science advisors. Even agencies such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have done little to provide a platform for the world’s science advisors. Specialized agencies such as UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the UN Industrial Development Organization relate to the UN secretary general’s office through a bureaucratic hierarchy that is not responsive to timeliness. They are generally accountable to their governing bodies and are heavily influenced by the interests of activist states. Even UN programs that deal with science-based issues such as the environment have yet to place knowledge at the core of their operations. They have failed to take into account the long-term implications of scientific advancement for their operations. Much of the attention in these programs is devoted to territorial aggrandizement and not to the role of knowledge in global governance. They are vestiges of Cold War institutional structures.

#### P5 veto powser means nothing gets done

Koliward, 21 (Priya Koliwad, 10-06-2021, "Is the United Nations Still a Relevant International Body? — The World Mind ," World Mind, <https://www.theworldmind.org/home/2021/10/26/is-the-united-nations-still-a-relevant-international-body>, LASA-CSK)

One of the arguments at the forefront in support for eliminating the United Nations is that the most powerful organ of the UN, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is not relevant to the modern world. The main evidence for this claim is that the UNSC only has five permanent member states: USA, Russia, Britain, China, France) and 10 non-permanent member states. This structure results in misuse of veto power, often blocking key decisions that are needed by nations with little to no representation. It also prevents developing countries from being represented, which is necessary in the present day.

Over the years, it has become clear that the Security Council’s permanent members have little interest in internal reform. Since this is the case, it is in the best interest of the other UN member states to continue to push for reform. With powerful countries moving to unilateralism, populism, and nationalism at the expense of multilateralism and collective action, a united and forward-looking Security Council capable of effectively driving the wider United Nations to achieve its goals is essential.

### 2AC – AT: RCA NB

#### Russia and China prevent Security Council effectiveness – NATO avoids

EL-Bawab, 4/26 (Nadine El-Bawab, 4-26-2022, "UN Security Council's inaction on Ukraine prompts questions on reform," ABC News, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/security-councils-inaction-ukraine-prompts-questions-reform/story?id=84222703>, LASA-CSK)

While experts said the U.N. facilitates diplomacy and keeps the lines of communication open between major powers, the Security Council's actions are tied to major powers' interests. The inequity of the Security Council is that nothing can be done if it opposes what the major powers want, Poast said. While the Security Council has not been able to pass any resolutions regarding the war in Ukraine or act to stop or prevent it, Poast said taking action is not part of its role. That is why NATO was created; to have a separate union, without China and Russia, allowing Western states to take action. "One of the big things that drove the process of creating NATO was the recognition sitting around late 1947 [to] 1948, that, from the British and the American perspective, they weren't going to be able to work with the Soviet Union," Poast said, adding that the powers needed a separate entity that would enable them to take action. Even in the early days of the U.N., Poast said there were concerns over whether the British, French and Americans would be able to work with the Soviets and Chinese. This was proven in 1999 when NATO took action in Kosovo, after the Security Council did not act, and again in 2011 when NATO intervened in Libya. "It's also a key reason why we're seeing NATO be very active in this war, because of exactly the fact that the U.N. Security Council has been ineffective in doing anything about this. But in contrast, NATO has been highly effective in trying to do something to support Ukraine," Poast said.